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GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS: WHEN DO THEY BECOME
PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE?
ABSTRACT
Government payments received by a debtor postpetition are often tied to
prepetition events, presenting the issue of whether a legal or equitable interest
existed as of the commencement of the case under § 541 of the Bankruptcy
Code. The Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that a debtor
has no legal or equitable interest in a government payment until the legislation
authorizing the payment is signed into law. These decisions, however, failed to
articulate a clear standard, as evidenced by recent case law.
The issue of when a government payment becomes property of the estate
has been particularly contentious in the crop disaster payment context. A new
program, the Supplemental Revenue Assistance Program (SURE), presents a
novel fact pattern. In SURE, the Secretary of Agriculture must designate the
county where a crop was lost as a disaster county before a farmer can qualify
for payment. Therefore, when a bankruptcy petition is filed, payment may still
be contingent upon an act within the agency’s discretion.
This Comment will argue that a government payment becomes property of
the estate when the payment is “absolutely owed,” meaning the payment is no
longer contingent in any way. First, the case law reveals no clear standard as
to when a government payment becomes property of the estate under § 541.
The right to setoff in § 553 has a clearer rule, a contrast that can help guide
analysis. Second, recent cases regard the statutory authorization date as
determinative, but this approach runs contrary to the Code and relevant case
law, for §§ 541 and 553 require a more nuanced factual inquiry. Third,
administrative law dictates that a government payment becomes an entitlement
for purposes of due process when legal sources create enforceable standards
that guide an agency’s discretion. This standard should control when agency
discretion is an issue.
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INTRODUCTION
Once a debtor obtains a legal or equitable interest in a government
payment, two sections of the Bankruptcy Code (Code) are at play. The first is
§ 541(a) of the Code, which governs when property becomes part of the
bankruptcy estate.1 The second is § 553, which preserves a creditor’s right to
offset an obligation to a debtor against the debtor’s obligation to the creditor.2
In deciding whether postpetition government payments were property of the
estate, courts initially took an expansive view, concluding that debtors have a
legal or equitable interest in a government payment as long as the loss or event
to which the payment is tied to occurred prepetition. Courts reached this result
even when legislation authorizing the payment was passed postpetition. In the
past ten years, the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have narrowed
this expansive interpretation of § 541, and have held that a debtor has no legal
or equitable interest in a government payment until the legislation authorizing
the payment is signed into law.3 These decisions, however, fail to articulate a
clear standard.
Analysis of recent cases reveals that the lack of a clear standard has led
courts to produce inconsistent holdings, often concluding that a debtor does not
have a legal or equitable interest in a government payment until the statutory
authorization date.4 This approach runs contrary to the Code, which requires a
more nuanced factual inquiry.5 Under § 541(a) courts should analyze the
government payment program and the facts of the case to determine if all the
conditions necessary for the payment to be a legal or equitable interest
occurred prepetition.6 Importing the language from the right to setoff set forth
in § 553, the payment must be “owing” at the time of the petition in order for a
creditor to possess the right to setoff.7 Using such language in the context of
§ 541(a) analysis is useful because it emphasizes the necessary factual inquiry
courts must engage in under both provisions.

1

11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012).
Id. § 553.
3 See Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2006); Burgess v. Sikes (In
re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 507 (5th Cir. 2006); Drewes v. Vote (In re Vote), 276 F.3d 1024, 1026‒27 (8th Cir.
2002); Sliney v. Battley (In re Schmitz), 270 F.3d 1254, 1255 (9th Cir. 2001).
4 See generally In re Farmer, No. 10-09353, 2012 WL 4905480 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 15, 2012).
5 See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a), 553.
6
See id. § 541(a).
7
See generally id. § 553.
2
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If a court engages in the necessary factual inquiry, it may encounter unique
factual wrinkles. One government payment program, the Supplemental
Revenue Assistance Program (SURE), is an illustrative example. The SURE
program provides assistance to farmers who have lost crops due to a natural
disaster.8 Under SURE, the Secretary of Agriculture must designate the county
where the crop was lost as a disaster county before the farmer can qualify for
payment.9 Therefore, at the time a bankruptcy petition is filed, payment may
still be contingent upon an act within the agency’s discretion.10 The novel
factual issue presented by this program is whether a government payment is
property of the estate when a government agency has discretion over a
qualification requirement at the time of the bankruptcy petition.
When the mechanics of a government payment program pose an issue of
agency discretion, bankruptcy courts should look to administrative law.
Administrative law dictates that a government payment becomes an
entitlement for purposes of due process when legal sources create enforceable
standards that guide an agency’s discretion.11 This standard should be adopted
when determining whether a government payment is property of the estate.
This Comment will argue that a government payment becomes property of the
estate when it is “absolutely owed,” meaning all contingencies for payment are
satisfied, including when enforceable standards remove an agency’s discretion.
I. BACKGROUND
To determine exactly when a government payment becomes “absolutely
owing,” a court must engage in a factual inquiry of the government payment
program at issue, and apply the mechanics of the program to the facts of the
case. The SURE program provides an illustrative example of how a court
would conduct this analysis, including discussion of the relevant statutes and
regulations. It also demonstrates how novel issues can arise when a court
engages in a close factual analysis of a government payment program. In
particular, SURE presents the problem of agency discretion over a condition
8 Farm Serv. Agency, Fact Sheet, Supplemental Revenue Assistance Payments (SURE) Program, U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC., 1 (Jan. 2011), http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/sure_2011.pdf.
9 Id. at 1–2.
10 See Motion to Lift Stay and For Offset, In re Farmer, No. 10-09353 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Feb. 29, 2012);
Emergency Designation News Release, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Dec. 2010), https://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/
newsReleases?area=newsroom&subject=landing&topic=edn&newstype=ednewsrel&type=detail&item=ed_20
101201_rel_0128.html [hereinafter News Release] (declaring forty-two counties in North Carolina as Primary
Natural Disaster Areas should provide aid for affected farmers).
11 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577‒78 (1972).
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necessary for payment. This issue arises when a Secretarial Disaster
Designation has yet to be made at the time of the petition.
Historically, most crop disaster payment programs have been either
permanently funded and immediately available through successive Farm Bills
or authorized by Congress as patchwork relief after a natural disaster
occurred.12 SURE is a relatively new crop disaster payment program
authorized by the 2008 Farm Bill.13 Eligibility is dependent upon the farmer
holding the Farm Service Agency (“USDA”) crop insurance for the relevant
crop year as well as a documented qualifying crop loss.14 A 10% qualifying
loss is required if the farmer’s land is located in a Designated Secretarial
Disaster County (designated by the Secretary of Agriculture), or a 50%
qualifying loss if the land is located in a non-Designated Secretarial Disaster
County.15
In the SURE program, an eligible producer can receive a payment equal to
60% of the difference between the targeted level of revenue and the actual total
revenue received during the relevant crop year.16 To find the targeted level of
revenue, USDA calculates the average market price of the crop over the course

12 DENNIS A. SHIELDS & RALPH M. CHITE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21212, AGRICULTURAL DISASTER
ASSISTANCE 1 (2010). The areas it covers include crop subsidies, international trade, rural development, food
safety, and environmental conservation. The USDA disaster payment programs relating to crop loss that enjoy
regular Farm Bill funding include NAP (Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program), and Emergency Farm
Loans. Id. at 2‒3, 6‒7.
13 Id. at 4. Funding is allocated for the 2008–2011 crop years. See generally Definition of Crop Year,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cropyear.asp#axzz2Lkq1mjZl (last visited Mar. 6, 2013)
(A crop year is defined as “[t]he time period from one year’s harvest to the next for an agricultural commodity.
Crop year varies for each commodity . . . [and] has an influence on the price of a commodity, since the quality
of the harvest may differ from year to year.”). In December of 2012, Congress extended the 2008 Farm Bill for
nine months, effectively funding the SURE program for the 2012 crop year. See David Rogers, Fiscal Cliff
Deal Includes Farm Bill Extension, POLITICO (last updated Jan. 12, 2013, 10:23 AM), http://www.politico.
com/story/2013/01/fiscal-cliff-deal-include-farm-bill-extension-85641.html.
14 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 8. A “qualifying crop production loss” is a term used in the various
crop disaster assistance programs to indicate the loss at issue has an eligible producer, an eligible crop, and
loss stemming from an eligible natural disaster. An eligible producer must be a landowner, tenant or
sharecropper who shares in the risk of producing a crop. An eligible crop is a commercially produced crop,
grown for food, livestock production or some other agricultural purpose. An eligible natural disaster includes
damaging weather such as drought or floods, adverse natural occurrences or a condition relating to damaging
weather such as excessive heat. Supplemental Revenue Assistance Payments (SURE) Program Backgrounder,
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 1‒4 (Jan. 2011), https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/sure_bkgder_122309.pdf
[hereinafter SURE Backgrounder].
15 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 8.
16 SHIELDS & CHITE, supra note 12, at 4.
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of the relevant crop year.17 The calculation of actual total revenue takes into
account the direct and counter-cyclical USDA payments the farmer received,
actual crop revenue received, and any insurance indemnities received.18
USDA’s direct and counter-cyclical payments, or crop subsidies, are calculated
based on a farmer’s acreage and the type of crop grown.19 The exact, direct, or
counter-cyclical payment due per acre varies significantly between various
types of crop.20 This method of calculation means that the amount a farmer is
due under SURE may be zero, particularly when the type of crop lost is heavily
subsidized.21 In summary, the SURE payment, in simplified form, looks
something like this:
SURE Payment = [Targeted Revenue – Actual Revenue] x .60
Targeted Revenue = crop revenue based on average market price +
crop insurance payment
Actual Revenue = actual crop revenue + direct/counter-cyclical
payments + insurance indemnities.22
The average market price of a crop over the course of a crop year, also
called the crop marketing period, takes approximately seven months to
calculate from the end of the crop year.23 The crop year ends at the conclusion
of a particular commodity’s primary harvesting period.24 Due to the time delay
necessary to gather the relevant market information, the SURE application
periods open up approximately one year after the close of the crop marketing
period.25
Eligibility for a SURE payment typically hinges on whether the applicant
farmer’s land and destroyed crops are located in a Secretarial Designated

17 Id. The targeted level of revenue also takes into account the level of crop insurance coverage selected
by the farmer, thereby increasing the SURE payment if the farmer selects a higher level of coverage. Id.
18 SURE Backgrounder, supra note 14, at 1–2.
19 Id. at 2.
20 Direct and Counter-Cyclical Program and Average Crop Revenue Election Program: Crop Years
2008‒2012, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 1 (Dec. 2011), http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/fce_dcp_rates_
chart.pdf.
21 See id.; SURE Backgrounder, supra note 14, at 4–5.
22 See SURE Backgrounder, supra note 14, at 4–6.
23 See Understanding USDA Crop Forecasts, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 15–16 (Mar. 1999), http://www.nass.
usda.gov/Education_and_Outreach/Understanding_Statistics/pub1554.pdf.
24 INVESTOPEDIA, supra note 13.
25 SHIELDS & CHITE, supra note 12, at 4.
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Disaster County.26 As previously mentioned, the 2008 Farm Bill makes SURE
relief available for farmers located in these disaster counties if they experience
a 10% qualifying loss.27 Because this threshold is low, it effectively makes
relief available to a vast number of farmers. The process by which the
Secretary of Agriculture determines which counties have experienced a natural
disaster affecting a given crop year was first set forth in a USDA promulgated
regulation at 7 C.F.R. § 1945.20.28
The original process set out in § 1945.20 first required the request of a
natural disaster designation to be made by the Governor or Tribal Council of
the afflicted county.29 Next, the USDA National Office notified the appropriate
USDA State Director, who was responsible for investigating the physical crop
losses experienced in the requested county.30 The USDA State Director was
then to provide a formal recommendation in the form of a written report.31
Upon receiving the State Director’s report, the National Office added
additional crop yield information and sent the final report to the Secretary of
Agriculture for use in making a decision on the requested natural disaster
designation.32 This entire process typically took somewhere between a few
months to a year.33 For example, all Secretarial Designated Disaster Counties
for the 2010 crop year were made by May 3, 2011.34
On July 13, 2012, a new rule creating a new expedited process was issued
in the Federal Register, striking down 7 C.F.R. § 1945.20 for all designations
made on or after July 12, 2012.35 The expedited process resolves two issues.36
It provides for automatic designation if emergency drought levels are
reached.37 If emergency drought levels are not reached, then the prior
designation process is still applicable with one important change: the new
26

Id.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
28 7 C.F.R. § 1945.20 (2009) (current version at 7 C.F.R. § 759 (2013)).
29 Id. § 1945.20(b).
30 Id. § 1945.20(b)(1)(ii).
31 Id. § 1945.20(b)(1)(iii). The State Director was also authorized to complete any surveys necessary to
gather information on the extent of the alleged disaster. Id. § 1945.20(b)(2)(iv).
32 Id. § 1945.20(b)(3).
33 See Farm Service Agency, Secretarial Designations – SURE 2010 Disaster Incidents – Final Report,
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (May 3, 2011), http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/sure_2010gis_final050311
pd.pdf.
34 Id.
35 Disaster Designation Process, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,248, (proposed July 13, 2012) (to be codified 7 C.F.R.
§ 759).
36 Id. at 41,248, 41,250.
37 Id.
27
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disaster designation procedure removes the requirement that a Governor or
Tribal Council must first request the designation, and permits the USDA State
Director or Secretary of Agriculture to initiate an investigation
independently.38 Although the significance or efficacy of this change has yet to
be seen, in theory it should speed up the designation process and give USDA
the ability to independently initiate the designation process when it sees fit.39
Under SURE, farmers are not “absolutely owed” payment until they (1)
experience a qualifying loss, and (2) the Secretary of Agriculture designates
the county through the process described in 7 C.F.R. § 1945.20, or the
expedited process in 7 C.F.R. § 759.40 The designation under § 759 is largely
the same as under § 1945.20, unless “extreme” drought levels are reached,
which makes the designation automatic.41 The novel issue of agency discretion
over a condition necessary for payment arises when the crop is lost prepetition,
yet the county where the crop was lost has yet to obtain a Secretarial Disaster
Designation when the debtor farmer files a bankruptcy petition. Stated
generally, the issue is, can a debtor have a legal or equitable interest in a
government payment, so as to be “absolutely owing,” when agency discretion
exists over a necessary qualifying condition at the time of the bankruptcy
petition? This searching inquiry into the mechanics of SURE is illustrative of
the factual analysis a court must engage in to determine when a government
payment is “absolutely owed” to the debtor. It also demonstrates the novel
issue of agency discretion that may arise.
II. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE UNDER § 541
When a debtor files a petition for bankruptcy, a bankruptcy estate is created
that serves as a means of repaying creditors.42 The section of the Code that
defines and limits the bankruptcy estate is § 541.43 Subsection (a)(1) is a broad
provision, stating that a bankruptcy estate consists of “all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”44 The
bankruptcy estate therefore includes almost any asset or interest of value the
debtor has at the time of filing, a broad reading that is strongly supported by
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

7 C.F.R. § 759.6 (2012).
Disaster Designation Process, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,248, (July 13, 2012) (to be codified 7 C.F.R. § 759).
See 7 C.F.R. §§ 759, 1945.20 (2009).
See 7 C.F.R. § 759.5 (2013).
See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012).
Id.
Id.
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the legislative history of the Code.45 Generally, § 541(a)(1) allows the debtor
to keep property acquired postpetition, preserving the debtor’s opportunity for
a fresh start.46 Subsection (a)(6), however, expands upon the definition
provided in (a)(1) by bringing within the bankruptcy estate “proceeds . . . of or
from property of the estate.”47 In bankruptcy cases in which the debtor has or
may receive government payments, creditors frequently make two alternative
arguments: that a payment received postpetition is either property of the estate
under § 541(a)(1) or proceeds of property of the estate under § 541(a)(6).48
Based on a court’s interpretation of the word “proceeds” and the term
“legal or equitable interest,” either argument can be effective.49 On one hand,
the court could determine that a government payment program created a legal
interest in the payment at some point prepetition.50 On the other hand,
bankruptcy courts can also determine a postpetition payment is “proceeds” of
or from property of the estate.51 Because the Code is interpreted broadly,
property of the estate can even include dead crops, making crop disaster
payments “proceeds” of the debtor’s prepetition, albeit useless, property.52
Although the Code indicates that government payments received
postpetition can be property of the bankruptcy estate under § 541, it remains
unclear at exactly what point and under what line of reasoning such payments
become property of the estate. Analysis of the case law shows that courts
initially took an expansive view, concluding debtors have a legal or equitable
interest in a government payment as long as the loss or event to which the
payment is tied to occurred prepetition.53 Courts reached this result even when
45

See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 367 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6004.
See Burgess v. Sikes (In re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 497 (5th Cir. 2006).
47 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6). Even when a bankruptcy court finds a crop disaster payment to be “proceeds”
within the meaning of § 541(a)(6), the payment still must be “property of the estate” as defined in § 541(a)(1).
This requirement is due to the language of § 541(a)(6), which states the bankruptcy estate includes
“proceeds . . . of or from property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (emphasis added). Therefore
§ 541(a)(6) expressly incorporates the definition of property of the estate provided in § 541(a)(1).
48 See Burgess, 438 F.3d at 496‒97; Drewes v. Lesmeister (In re Lesmeister), 242 B.R. 920, 923 (D.N.D.
1999).
49 See Burgess, 438 F.3d at 496.
50 See Id. at 498‒99; Lesmeister, 242 B.R. at 923‒24. Claims that are contingent, unliquidated or
unmatured are property of the estate under § 541(a)(1) as long as the debtor has a prepetition legal right or
interest. See Lesmeister, 242 B.R. at 924‒25.
51 See Lemos v. Rakozy (In re Lemos), 243 B.R. 96, 101 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999), abrogated by In re
Stallings, 290 B.R. 777 (D. Idaho 2003).
52 See Lesmeister, 242 B.R. at 924 (citing Kelley v. Ring (In re Ring), 169 B.R. 73, 77 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
1993), aff’d, 160 B.R. 692 (M.D. Ga. 1993)); Ring, 169 B.R. at 77.
53 See infra notes 83–88 and accompanying text.
46
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the authorizing legislation was passed postpetition. In the past ten years, the
Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have cut back on this expansive
interpretation of § 541, and held that a debtor has no legal or equitable interest
in a government payment until the legislation authorizing the payment is
signed into law.54 These decisions created one clear rule, but failed to articulate
an overarching standard.
The relevant case law can be organized into three basic fact patterns. The
first occurs when both the authorizing legislation is passed prepetition, and the
debtor files an application to participate in the government payment program
prepetition. The second category consists of cases in which the authorizing
legislation is passed prepetition, but the debtor does not file an application to
participate until after the bankruptcy petition. Finally, the third category of
cases features both postpetition legislation authorizing the program, and a
postpetition application on the part of the debtor.55 Discussion of the case law
organized into these factual “buckets” highlights different reasoning schemes
that bankruptcy courts use when trying to determine when a debtor obtains a
legal right to a government payment. It also highlights the need for a clear
standard to guide the analysis of when a government payment becomes
property of the estate.
A. Prepetition Legislation and Prepetition Application Date
At first glance it seems like this factual category should present little to no
issue in the context of § 541(a) analysis. However, § 541 arguments can still
arise when agency approval of a debtor’s application does not occur until after
the date of the bankruptcy petition.56 This factual pattern therefore emphasizes
when a legal right or interest in a government payment may form as between
three dates in time: the date of the debtor’s application, the date the agency
approves the debtor’s application, or the date of contract formation.57

54 See Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2006); Burgess, 438 F.3d
507; Drewes v. Vote (In re Vote), 276 F.3d 1024, 1026‒27 (8th Cir. 2002); Sliney v. Battley (In re Schmitz),
270 F.3d 1254, 1255 (9th Cir. 2001).
55 A factual permutation in which the debtor’s application is filed prepetition and the authorizing
legislation is passed postpetition is not possible because an application for a government payment program
cannot be filed if a government payment program does not exist.
56 See In re Mattice, 81 B.R. 504, 507 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987).
57 See Schneider v. Nazar (In re Schneider), 864 F.2d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1988); Mattice, 81 B.R. at 507.
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In re Mattice is one of the earliest cases to interpret § 541(a)(1)’s temporal
limitation in the context of government payment programs.58 In Mattice, the
court held that a debtor does not have a right to a government program
payment until the debtor’s application is approved.59 Here, the debtors’
application to participate in the 1986 Feed and Grain Program was approved
on May 9, 1986.60 On December 23, 1986, the debtors filed a joint petition for
bankruptcy.61 The debtors’ application for the 1987 Feed and Grain Program
was filed prior to filing for bankruptcy, but approved after the filing on
December 31, 1986.62 The Feed and Grain Program required the debtors to
divert certain acreage from agricultural use in return for a cash payment.63
USDA argued that the Feed and Grain Program payments were subject to
the security agreement it had against the debtors’ property, and that § 552(b)
applied.64 Section 552(b) creates an exception to § 552(a)’s rule that property
acquired after filing a petition is not subject to any lien resulting from any
security agreement entered into before the case.65 Specifically, § 552(b) states
that a security agreement executed before bankruptcy can extend to proceeds
acquired after the filing of bankruptcy if they are proceeds of property the
debtor acquired before the commencement of the case.66
The court held that this exception was not applicable to the 1987 program
payments because the debtors had “no rights in the 1987 program payment
until their application was approved, which occurred after the filing.”67 The
1987 program payments were therefore not property of the estate under
§ 541(a)(1).68 The 1986 program payments, however, were property of the
estate under § 541(a)(1) because debtors obtained legal rights to the payment
through approval of their application prior to filing for bankruptcy.69 This case
stands for the proposition that a legal right to government payments is created
when the program application is accepted, not when it is filed.70
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

See Mattice, 81 B.R. 504.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 506.
Id.
Id. at 505.
Id. at 506.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 506–07; see 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012).
Mattice, 81 B.R. at 507.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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A similar case, Schneider v. Nazar (In re Schneider), found the government
payment program at issue to effectively create a contractual obligation, with
continuing duties to be exchanged between the debtor and creditor.71 Due to
the continuing and mutual nature of the payment program, the court held the
debtor could not have a legal right or interest in the government payment until
each party had signed and approved the contract that authorizes payment.72 In
Schneider, the payment at issue was administered by USDA’s Commodity
Credit Corporation as part of a crop reduction and diversion program.73 On
March 12, 1984 the debtor requested an eligibility determination from the
Commodity Credit Corporation.74 On March 27, 1984 the debtor filed a
petition for bankruptcy.75 On April 16, 1984 the Government determined the
debtor was eligible for the crop reduction and diversion program.76
The court held that the debtor did not have a legal right to the payments
prepetition because the contract for the payments had not been formed as of the
date of the petition.77 The eligibility agreement created an executory contract
in which services were to be exchanged, because it required the debtor to limit
the acres of wheat planted in return for payment.78 Although the amount of the
entitlement was liquidated and determinable at the time of the bankruptcy
petition under the USDA regulations, the contract required future services by
the debtor before the payment could become due.79 The key point from this
case is that payments received postpetition are not property of the estate under
§ 541(a)(1) if the contract was formed postpetition.80
Mattice and Schnedier each featured government payment programs that
were contractual in nature, and required future performance by the debtor.
These cases indicate that when a government payment program is contractual,
a debtor does not obtain a legal or equitable interest in the government
payment until the contract is formed, often through application approval.

71

Schneider v. Nazar (In re Schneider), 864 F.2d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 685‒86.
73 Id. at 684.
74 Id. at 684 n.1.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 685–86.The government did not approve the debtor’s participation in the program and sign the
contract until April 16, 1984, three weeks after the debtor filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 684 n.1.
78 Id. at 685.
79 Id. at 686.
80 Id.
72
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B. Prepetition Legislation and Postpetition Application Date
The second factual pattern highlights when a government payment
becomes property of the estate between two different points in time: when the
legislation is passed, or when the debtor files an application for payment.81
Key to this analysis is whether the debtor has a legal or equitable interest in the
government payment at the time of the bankruptcy petition, or just a mere hope
or expectancy.82
Segal v. Rochelle is the only case in which the Supreme Court has weighed
in on when a government payment becomes property of the estate.83 The case
was decided in 1966 and predates the Code. The Court, however, emphasized
the purposes of the old Bankruptcy Act, explaining that the “bankruptcy
estate” should be broadly interpreted.84 An interest should not be deemed
outside its reach because it was novel or contingent at the time the debtor filed
for bankruptcy.85 The Court articulated a “sufficiently rooted” test to determine
if tax refunds tied to prepetition losses, but received postpetition, were property
of the bankruptcy estate.86 The Court held that the tax refund claims were
“sufficiently rooted” in the prebankruptcy past, not entangled with the debtor’s
fresh start, and should be considered a part of the bankruptcy estate.87 The
“sufficiently rooted” test from Segal does not find a particular date or event to
determine when a debtor acquires a legal right to payment, but rather uses a
purpose-based approach in which the facts as a whole must be analyzed.88
The more modern, post-Code case, Kelley v. Ring (In re Ring), held that
although the debtor did not apply for disaster payment benefits until after filing
for bankruptcy, the payments were property of the estate because they
qualified as proceeds under § 541(a)(6).89 In Ring, the debtor experienced crop
losses during the 1990 and 1991 crop years.90 The legislation authorizing the
disaster payments at issue was signed into law on December 12, 1991.91 On
81 See Boyett v. Moore (In re Boyett), 250 B.R. 817, 822 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2000); Drewes v. Lesmeister
(In re Lesmeister), 242 B.R. 920, 925 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1999).
82 See Boyett, 250 B.R. at 821.
83 Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
84 Id. at 379.
85 Id. at 380.
86 Id. at 376, 379.
87 Id.
88 See id.
89 See Kelley v. Ring (In re Ring), 169 B.R. 73, 77 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993).
90 See id. at 74.
91 Id.
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January 10, 1992, the debtor filed his petition for bankruptcy, and did not list
in his schedule of assets a claim for crop disaster payments.92 In February of
1992, the debtor applied for the crop disaster benefits, and on April 15, 1992,
the application was approved, and the debtor was paid $58,987.00.93
The court interpreted precedent as framing the relevant issue to be whether
the debtor’s postpetition entitlements under the disaster assistance program
qualified as “proceeds” under § 541(a)(6).94 The court found the disaster
payments “analogous to insurance payments for crop loss or damage.”95 The
definition of proceeds under the relevant UCC provision at the time, UCC § 9306, expressly included “insurance payable by reason of loss or damage to the
collateral.”96 The determinative factor for the court was that the property lost,
the crop, was prepetition property that the debtor had a legal right or interest in
prior to the commencement of the case.97 Therefore, “proceeds” of the lost
crop became part of the bankruptcy estate at the time the petition was filed.98
The purpose of the disaster payment is to compensate the debtor for crop
losses, much like a postpetition insurance payment.99 Like Segal, Ring did not
find a certain date in time to dictate when a debtor obtains a legal or equitable
interest in a government payment.100 Ring instead focused on the language of
the Code and the UCC, applying the statutory provisions to the facts of the
given case.101
The issue raised in the next case, Drewes v. Lesmeister (In re Lesmeister),
is whether a government payment is property of the estate when the legislation
is passed prepetition, but the regulations are promulgated postpetition.102 In
Lesmeister, the debtors argued that because the federal regulations establishing
the procedures for payment under the Crop Loss Disaster Assistance Program
(CLDAP) were promulgated postpetition, the disaster payments were not
property of the estate under § 541(a).103 In Lesmeister, the Agricultural and
Rural Redevelopment Act that authorized CLDAP funding was signed into law
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id.
Id.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 76 n.4 (citations omitted).
Id. at 77.
Id.
Id.
See Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 511, 515 (1966); Ring, 169 B.R. at 75 n.3, 76 n.4.
Ring, 169 B.R. at 75 n.3, 76 n.4.
Drewes v. Lesmeister (In re Lesmeister), 242 B.R. 920, 925 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1999).
Id. at 923.
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after the debtors’ crop loss on October 21, 1998.104 On February 10, 1999, the
debtor farmer filed a bankruptcy petition.105 On April 15, 1999, USDA
promulgated and issued the final CLDAP regulations.106
The court stated that to determine whether a legally cognizable property
right exists within the meaning of § 541(a)(1), one must focus on whether all
events establishing the debtor’s right to payment occurred prepetition.107
Because it was undisputed that the debtors lost their crop prepetition, the issue
became whether the debtors had a sufficient “legal interest” in the crop disaster
payment at the time of the bankruptcy petition.108 Specifically, was a legal
interest in the program payments created by the passage of the enabling act in
October of 1998, or upon promulgation of the final regulations in April of
1999?109
The court held that a legal interest was created when the bill authorizing the
crop payment program was signed into law.110 The statutory scheme dictated
the substance of the payments, and the regulations only laid out the procedural
mechanisms for applying and calculating the payment amount.111 All of the
events necessary to establish the debtor’s right to payment occurred
prepetition, with the last necessary condition being passage of the
legislation.112 What the debtor had at the time of the bankruptcy petition was a
contingent claim, closely analogous to an “action for damages not yet put into
suit.”113 Furthermore, the court refused to subject the Code’s definition of
§ 541 to the narrower parameters of the UCC.114 The court noted that although
the UCC definition of proceeds is useful, it is by no means mandatory to
use.115 Rather, to interpret § 541(a)(6) it is essential to accept the notion that
“when a debtor acquires an interest in property . . . § 541(a)(1) includes any
legal or equitable interest which is inherently a far more expansive concept
than the [UCC] definition of proceeds.”116
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Id. at 922–23.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 922–23.
Id. at 924–25.
See id. at 924.
Id. at 925 (referring to attachment which is a “prerequisite to enforcement of a security interest”).
Id.
Id. at 925–26.
Id. at 925.
Id. at 924–25.
Id. at 924.
Id.
Id.
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Although Lesmeister is similar to Ring in that no date is determinative as to
when a debtor obtains a legal interest in a government payment, Lesmeister
found the payment program’s proceeds to be property of the estate by focusing
on the relevant § 541 provisions rather than by making a comparison to
insurance payments.117 What is interesting is the language of the Lesmeister
test, which examines whether all acts and events giving rise to the debtors’
right to participate in the program occurred prepetition.118
The most recent case under this factual bucket is Boyett v. Moore (In re
Boyett).119 In Boyett, the court explicitly rejected the argument that a debtor
does not have a legal or equitable interest in a crop disaster payment until his
application is filed or approved.120 Here, the legislation authorizing the
CLDAP program became law on October 21, 1998.121 On February 16, 1999
the debtor petitioned for bankruptcy relief, prior to filing a CLDAP application
on April 6, 1999.122 The regulations for CLDAP became effective on April 15,
1999.123
The debtor argued that although the CLDAP program was enacted prior to
his bankruptcy filing, he did not have a legal interest in the payment at the time
of filing because the regulations and sign-up period were not established until
after the date of petition.124 The court championed the Lesmeister decision,
reiterating that a debtor has a legal or equitable interest in a government
payment when all events giving rise to the benefit occurred prepetition.125 The
court therefore considered the payment to be property of the estate under
§ 541(a)(1) because all events giving rise to the benefit, including the
authorizing legislation and crop loss, occurred prepetition.126
In addition, the court reaffirmed that disaster payments based on prepetition
losses are additional compensation for crops grown prebankruptcy, and
117 Compare id. (the Code’s definition of “interest” is much more expansive than the UCC’s definition of
“proceeds”), with Kelley v. Ring (In re Ring), 169 B.R. 73, 77 (M.D. Ga. 1993) (arguing that under the UCC,
disaster relief program payments are like insurance payments).
118 Lesmeister, 242 B.R. at 926.
119 Boyett v. Moore (In re Boyett), 250 B.R. 817 (S.D. Ga. 2000).
120 See id.
121 Id. at 818.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 819.
125 See id. at 819–20 (citing Lemos v. Rakozy (In re Lemos), 243 B.R. 96, 100‒01 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1999), abrogated by In re Stallings, 290 B.R. 777 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003)).
126 Boyett, 250 B.R. at 820.
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therefore are proceeds of the estate pursuant to § 541(a)(6).127 The court also
distinguished crop disaster payment programs from contractual, or payment-inkind subsidy programs, like the one at issue in Mattice.128 In this case, CLDAP
payments are due to a farmer once all the conditions for payment are met.129 At
the time of filing in this case, debtor’s entitlement to payment existed because
the program had been enacted and the debtor had lost his crop, despite the fact
that the debtor’s payment could not be immediately realized.130 Thus, the
debtor’s postpetition application for payment was held to be “merely a
ministerial act, not a qualifying event.”131
The test emerging from the cases in this factual category appears to be
whether “all acts and events giving rise to [the debtor’s] right to participate in
the program arose [prepetition].”132 Similar to the first factual bucket, there is
no specific moment in time when the debtor obtains a legal or equitable
interest in a government payment.133 However, the court in Boyett contrasted
payment in kind programs with subsidy or entitlement programs, and explicitly
rejected the use of the postpetition program application date as a qualifying
event determinative to § 541(a) analysis of entitlement programs.134 Although
a clear date may not be settled, at least one option, a postpetition program
application date, has been rejected.
C. Postpetition Legislation and Postpetition Application Date
In the 2000s, the issue of whether a government payment authorized by
postpetition legislation could be considered property of the estate was widely
discussed and litigated. Early decisions took an expansive approach, holding
that any postpetition crop disaster payment arising from a prepetition crop loss

Id. (citing Lemos, 243 B.R. at 100‒01).
Compare Boyett, 250 B.R. at 820 (debtor made no claims to a contract with the government), with In
re Mattice, 81 B.R. 504, 506 (S.D. Iowa 1987) (farmers entered into agreements to not plant crops with the
government in exchange for monetary compensation). Payment-in-kind programs are executory contracts
because they involve an unperformed exchange of services, as the government pays the farmer in exchange for
his promise not to plant crops. Boyett, 250 B.R. at 822 (citing Schneider v. Nazar (In re Schneider) 864 F.2d
683, 685 (10th Cir. 1988); In re Schmaling, 783 F.2d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 1986)).
129 Boyett, 250 B.R. at 822.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Drewes v. Lesmeister (In re Lesmeister), 242 B.R. 920, 926 (D.N.D. 1999); see Boyett, 250 B.R. 817
(citing Lemos, 243 B.R. at 99).
133 See generally Lesmeister, 242 B.R. 920; Mattice, 81 B.R. 504.
134 Boyett, 250 B.R. at 822.
127
128
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was a contingent property interest within the scope of § 541(a)(1) or (6).135 The
Lemos v. Rakozy (In re Lemos) decision is perhaps the best example of this
approach.136 The court in Lemos held that crop disaster payments authorized by
postpetition legislation, were “so rooted” in prepetition crop losses as to
constitute property of the bankruptcy estate.137 The court reasoned the debtor
was entitled to the payments only as a result of events that occurred
prebankruptcy, with no substantial event occurring postbankruptcy that limited
or changed his eligibility.138 At the time the bankruptcy petition was filed, the
debtor had a contingent interest in the prospect of a federal program being
adopted to compensate him for his crop losses.139
Later decisions saw courts reconsider when a crop loss payment can be
considered property of the bankruptcy estate. The expansive approach
demonstrated by Lemos was curtailed by a new bright line rule that crop loss
payments cannot be considered property of the bankruptcy estate unless the
legislation authorizing the payment was enacted prepetition.140 The driving
principle behind this theory is that a debtor cannot have a contingent interest in
a government payment not yet authorized by Congress.141
This bright line rule was first articulated by the Eighth Circuit in Drewes v.
Vote (In re Vote).142 In Vote the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition on
September 7, 1999.143 Subsequent to the filing, on October 22, 1999, Congress
enacted the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000.144 The Act
provided payments for all farmers enrolled in 7-year production contracts
through USDA’s Market Loss Assistance Program (MLAP), and funded The
Crop Disaster Program (CDP) for the 1999 crop year.145 On November 3,

135

See Lemos, 243 B.R. at 99.
See generally id.
137 Id. at 100 (quoting Battley v. Schmitz (In re Schmitz), 224 B.R. 117 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1998)). The
“so rooted” test and its purpose driven approach is very similar to, and draws heavily upon, the Supreme
Court’s “sufficiently rooted” test set forth in Segal. Id. (quoting Battley v. Schmitz, (In re Schmitz), 224 B.R.
117, 124 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1998) (citing Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966))).
138 Lemos, 243 B.R. at 98‒99.
139 Id. at 99.
140 See Drewes v. Vote, (In re Vote), 261 B.R. 439, 443‒44 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001).
141 See generally Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454 F.3d 1234, 1236, 1246 (11th Cir. 2006);
Burgess v. Sikes (In re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 495 (5th Cir. 2006); Vote, 261 B.R. at 443‒44.
142 See Vote, 261 B.R. at 443‒44.
143 Id. at 440.
144 Id.
145 Id.
136
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1999, the debtor farmer received a MLAP payment, followed by two CDP
payments: one on February 9, 2000, and another on April 7, 2000.146
The court described the issue of whether a postpetition payment, enacted by
postpetition legislation, but rooted in prepetition crop losses, should be
considered property of the estate as an “extremely close call.”147 The court
considered two alternatives. On one hand, it reasoned that the broad
“sufficiently rooted” reasoning of Segal might support a finding that the CDP
payments in this case were property of the estate.148 On the other hand, it
reasoned that the holding in Segal is limited to tax refunds, and therefore, is
inapplicable to government payment programs, like MLAP and CDP.149 The
court concluded Segal was of limited applicability, and held that the debtor had
only an expectation or hope that Congress would pass crop relief legislation at
the time he filed for bankruptcy.150 Such an expectation did “not rise to the
level of a ‘legal or equitable interest’ in property such that it might be
considered property of the estate under § 541(a)(1).”151
Following the decision in Vote, other circuit courts heard similar cases
presenting the issue of whether crop disaster payments authorized by
postpetition legislation were property of the estate.152 For example, Burgess v.
Sikes (In re Burgess), a case that strongly endorsed Vote, held that a debtor did
not obtain a legal interest in a government payment until the postpetition
legislation authorizing the payment was passed.153 The debtor in Burgess filed
a petition for bankruptcy in August of 2002.154 In February of 2003, Congress
passed the Agricultural Assistance Act.155 The legislation “provided for crop
disaster-relief-payments to qualifying farmers for 2001 or 2002 crop losses.”156
146

Id.
Id. at 443.
148 Id. at 442–44 (quoting Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379‒81 (1966)).
149 Id. at 443–44. The court revisited the Code’s legislative history to determine if Segal’s definition of
property was dispositive. Surprisingly, the court discovered an alternate interpretation previously overlooked
within the congressional record: “The result in Segal v. Rochelle . . . is followed, and the right to a refund is
property of the estate.” Because of Segal’s “questionable applicability”, and the existence of a concrete date as
to when the debtor became legally entitled to the disaster relief payments, the court did not include the
payments within the property of the estate. Id.
150 Id. at 444.
151 Id.
152 See generally Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2006); Burgess v. Sikes
(In re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2006); In re Andrews, 386 B.R. 871 (Bankr. D. Utah 2008).
153 Burgess, 438 F.3d at 494, 499.
154 Id. at 495.
155 Id.
156 Id.
147
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The debtor applied for a relief payment in August of 2003, and shortly
thereafter USDA issued a check to the bankruptcy trustee for $24,829.157 The
debtor filed a Motion for Turnover arguing the check was not property of the
bankruptcy estate.158
A split court held that crop disaster payments authorized by postpetition
legislation are not property of the estate under either § 541(a)(1) or (6).159 The
court added that it could “find no case in which a pure loss with no attendant
potential benefit was included as property of the estate.”160 Furthermore, the
court concluded that “for the temporal limitation to have any meaning at all,
[the debtor] must have a prepetition interest in the disaster-relief payment
[itself],” as one cannot have a legal interest in a crop loss.161 Therefore, to have
a legal interest in a government payment, the authorizing legislation must have
been passed prepetition.162 Like the court in Vote, the court in Burgess found
that Segal did not survive enactment of the Code.163
Burgess featured a strong dissent, with seven out of the sixteen judges
dissenting.164 The dissent found § 541(a)(1) to describe property of the estate
“in the broadest possible terms,” and § 541(a)(6) to reach “all conceivable
[postpetition] returns yielded by the debtor’s property.”165 The dissent also
looked to Supreme Court precedent for support, finding that the Court
routinely concluded that property of the estate must be broadly interpreted.166
The dissent added that Segal affirms the idea that a loss prior to bankruptcy
can later yield property to be included in the bankruptcy estate.167 The fact that
Segal was mentioned in the legislative history of the Code supports the
proposition that it should be followed, and not disavowed.168 Burgess
highlights two approaches to § 541 analysis in the context of government

157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

6323).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 495, 508.
Id. at 503.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 498–99.
Id. at 508 (Jones, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983)).
Id. at 511 (citing Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966)).
See id. at 508 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 367 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
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payments: an expansive analysis, and a bright line approach in which a
program authorized by postpetition legislation is a mere expectation.169
A few months after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Burgess, the Eleventh
Circuit heard a similar case in Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell).170
Bracewell also held that crop disaster payments authorized by postpetition
legislation, but based on prepetition losses, are not property of the estate.171
The court reasoned that when legislation is passed postpetition the debtor has
“only a hope” that the legislation would be passed, and therefore has no right
or interest that constitutes property.172
The debtor in Bracewell lost a substantial amount of his 2001 crop due to a
drought.173 Unable to repay his debts, the debtor filed for bankruptcy on May
29, 2002.174 The Emergency Farmer and Rancher Assistance Act, signed into
law on February 20, 2003, provided for monetary assistance to farmers who
suffered losses to their 2001 or 2002 crops due to weather-related disasters or
emergency conditions.175 Shortly thereafter the debtor applied for payment and
received $41,566 while his bankruptcy case was still pending.176
The trustee argued that the payment was property of the estate pursuant to
§ 541(a)(6), claiming that it was proceeds of the estate, analogous to insurance
payments.177 The court reasoned that “there is a difference between insurance
payments stemming from the destruction of property” and “disaster assistance
authorized after the estate was created.”178 The destroyed crops did not fit
within the meaning of the term proceeds because they could not create
anything of value which could be exchanged or sold.179 Given this reasoning,
the court held that if the disaster legislation is not law at the time of filing, the
debtor cannot have a legal or equitable interest in the payment.180 The court
also found the two previous circuit court decisions in Vote and Burgess to be
persuasive support for the proposition that no legal or equitable interest can
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180

See id.
See Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454 F.3d 1234, 1247 (11th Cir. 2006).
See id.
Id. at 1239.
Id. at 1236.
Id. at 1247.
Id. at 1236.
Id. at 1237.
Id. at 1246.
Id.
Id. at 1247.
Id. at 1246.
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exist until the authorizing legislation is signed into law.181 Thus, § 541(a)(1)’s
temporal limitation controls the analysis, rather than Segal’s “sufficiently
rooted” pre-Code test.182
The one dissenting judge in Bracewell closely followed the dissent in
Burgess.183 The dissent emphasized Segal’s “sufficiently rooted” test, and
believed that the decision survived the passage of the Code.184 The dissent also
noted that both the current and previous versions of the Code featured an
expansive definition of property of the estate, lending credence to the notion
that Segal and a broad interpretation of property of the estate survives in
§ 541.185
The Vote, Burgess, and Bracewell opinions have drawn a line, holding that
a debtor cannot have a legal or equitable interest in a government payment if
the authorizing legislation was not signed into law prior to the bankruptcy
filing.186 These decisions reasoned that a debtor has no way of knowing
whether Congress would in fact confer payment, and could only hope that
relief legislation would be passed.187
The general issue left unanswered by cases analyzing § 541 is at what
precise point does a government payment become a legal entitlement or
property interest. The opinions seem to suggest three general possibilities: (1)
at the passage of the legislation; (2) at the approval of the application or at the
formation of a contract; or (3) when the debtor satisfies all the requirements for
payment.188 The one bright-line rule that has emerged is that crop disaster
payments authorized by postpetition legislation are under no circumstances
considered property of the bankruptcy estate.

181 See id. at 1238 (citing Burgess v. Sikes (In re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 2006); Drewes v.
Vote, (In re Vote), 261 B.R. 439, 443 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001)).
182 See id. (citing Burgess, 438 F.3d at 498; Vote, 261 B.R. at 443).
183 See Bracewell, 454 F.3d at 1249‒50 (Pryor, J., dissenting); Burgess, 438 F.3d at 508–11 (Jones, C.J.,
dissenting).
184 Bracewell, 454 F.3d at 1249‒50 (Pryor, J., dissenting).
185 Id. at 1050–51.
186 See generally id. (citing Burgess, 438 F.3d at 498; Vote, 261 B.R. 439).
187 Susan A. Schneider, Who Gets the Check: Determining When Federal Farm Programs Are Property of
the Estate, 84 NEB. L. REV. 469, 503 (2005).
188 See Bracewell, 454 F.3d at 1238 (citing Burgess, 438 F.3d at 498; Vote, 261 B.R. at 443).
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III. RIGHT TO SETOFF UNDER § 553
The right of a creditor to setoff mutual debts is set forth in § 553.189 Section
553 does not purport to create a right to setoff but rather “preserves” a preexisting right to setoff.190 The USDA’s right to setoff in bankruptcy is
authorized by 7 C.F.R. § 631.20.191
In order for a creditor’s prepetition right of setoff to survive in
bankruptcy under § 553(a), three requirements must be satisfied: (1)
the parties must owe each other mutual debts, (2) the mutual debts
must have arisen [prepetition], and (3) the creditor’s claim cannot fall
within one of the three statutory exceptions listed in § 553(a)(1)–
192
(3).

The main issue presented in the context of government payment programs
is whether the mutual debts arose prepetition.193 This occurs because a debtor
may experience a prepetition loss, but will not file an application for payment
until after a bankruptcy petition is filed, raising the issue of when the debt
actually arose.194 There appears to be a clearer standard under § 553 than under
§ 541. The right to setoff in § 553 articulates that the payment must be
“owing” at the time of the petition for a creditor to possess the right to setoff.
Again, discussion of the case law will fall into the factual buckets discussed
previously.
A. Prepetition Legislation and Prepetition Application Date
The two cases discussed in this factual bucket use similar “absolutely
owing” and “all transactions necessary” tests to determine when a debtor
obtains a legal or equitable interest in a government payment in the context of
setoff, indicating a clearer standard.195 The first case is Moratzka v.
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (In re Matthieson).196 In
Matthieson, six debtors were enrolled in the Federal Crop Deficiency Program
189

See 11 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
See id.
191 7 C.F.R. § 631.20 (2013).
192 United Serv. Prot. Corp. v. Bill Heard Enters., (In re Bill Heard Enters.), 438 B.R. 745, 750 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 2010) (citations omitted).
193 See generally In re Young, 144 B.R. 45, 45‒47 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (discussing the issue of
whether the mutual debt arose prepetition).
194 See generally Motion to Lift Stay and for Offset, In re Farmer, No. 10-09353 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2012).
195 Moratzka v. Agric. Stabilization & Conservation Serv. (In re Matthieson), 63 B.R. 56, 58–59 (D.
Minn. 1986); United States v. Gerth, 991 F.2d 1428, 1434–35 (8th Cir. 1993).
196 See Matthieson, 63 B.R. 56.
190
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for the 1984 growing season.197 After enrolling in the program, but before
receiving the payments, the debtors filed for bankruptcy.198 Each of the debtors
also owed the government prepetition debts.199
The sole issue was whether the deficiency payments owed by USDA to the
enrolled debtors were prepetition obligations and therefore subject to setoff
against the claim USDA had against each of the debtors.200 The court reasoned
that a government payment may be a prepetition debt for purposes of mutuality
notwithstanding the fact that the payment is immature.201 In other words, a
creditor’s right of setoff may be asserted in a bankruptcy case even though at
the time the petition is filed the debt is “absolutely owing” but is not yet
presently due.202 Furthermore, when an obligation exists prior to bankruptcy, it
is irrelevant that it is unliquidated until after the petition is filed.203
The court engaged in a factual analysis and found that the debtors satisfied
all the conditions for payment prior to filing for bankruptcy.204 The deficiency
program agreement did not contain any conditions precedent that remained
unsatisfied as of the petition date.205 Although the program did require certain
contractual duties to be performed by the debtor, these were contractual
promises rather than conditions precedent.206
In the second case, United States v. Gerth, the Eighth Circuit considered
the USDA’s motion to modify the automatic stay to permit setoff.207 In Gerth,
the USDA owed the debtor certain conservation reserve payments, and wished
to setoff these payments against a debt the debtor had previously incurred with
the USDA.208 The debtor however argued that the conservation reserve
payment did not arise prepetition because the program’s funds were annually

197

Matthieson, 63 B.R. at 56.
Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 59.
202 Id. at 58. (citing Traders Bank of Kan. City v. Stonitsch (In re Isis Foods, Inc.), 24 B.R. 75, 76 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1982). A debt is regarded as “absolutely owing” when there can be no question about the existence
of the debt. Isis Foods, 24 B.R. at 76.
203 Matthieson, 63 B.R. at 59 (citing Mich. Consol. Gas Co. v. Fred Sanders Co. (In re Fred Sanders Co.),
33 Bankr. 310, 312 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983)).
204 Id.
205 Id. at 60.
206 Id. at 59.
207 United States v. Gerth, 991 F.2d 1428, 1429 (8th Cir. 1993).
208 Id. at 1429–30.
198
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appropriated, and at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed the relevant
crop year’s funds had not been appropriated to the USDA.209
The Eighth Circuit held that “dependency on a [postpetition] event does not
prevent a debt from arising [prepetition].”210 The court added that a claim is
not deemed to be postpetition merely because it is contingent, unliquidated or
unmatured on the date of the bankruptcy petition.211 “A debt can be absolutely
owing [prepetition] even though that debt would never have come into
existence [but] for [postpetition] events.”212 A key factor for determining when
a government debt is owed prepetition is whether “all transactions necessary”
for the USDA’s liability took place prior to the farmer debtor’s filing of the
bankruptcy petition.213 Here, the court found that all transactions necessary
took place upon the debtor’s entry into the program because both parties
signed the conservation program contract prepetition.214 The postpetition
appropriation of funds by the USDA did not affect the farmer’s eligibility.215
The two cases discussed use similar “absolutely owing” and “all
transactions necessary” tests to determine when a debtor obtains a legal or
equitable interest in a government payment in the context of a setoff.216 The
cases also demonstrate that continuing contractual obligations and federal
appropriation of funds do not affect a debtor’s eligibility and therefore do not
sway analysis under § 553.217
B. Prepetition Legislation and Postpetition Application Date
The one case in this factual bucket, In re Gibson, similarly articulates a
clear “absolutely owing” rule.218 In Gibson, the USDA argued it was entitled to
offset loan deficiency payments worth $18,000, which were applied for and
received by the debtors postpetition.219 The debtors opposed the government’s
motion to lift the automatic stay, contending that their right to the loan
209

Id. at 1432.
Id. at 1433.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 1434.
213 See id. at 1435.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 1434–35.
216 Id.; Moratzka v. Agric. Stabilization & Conservation Serv. (In re Matthieson), 63 B.R. 56, 58–59 (D.
Minn. 1986).
217 See Gerth, 991 F.2d at 1434‒35; Matthieson, 63 B.R. at 59.
218 See In re Gibson, 308 B.R. 763, 765 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
219 Id.
210
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deficiency payments was a postpetition right, thereby foreclosing setoff under
§ 553.220
The court stated that for a debt to arise prepetition, such debt must have
been “absolutely owing” prepetition.221 This does not mean the debt must have
been due prepetition, or that the creditor must have initiated collection of the
debt prepetition.222 The court added that “it does not matter that [the] debt was
contingent, unliquidated, or unmatured as of the date of the filing,” but “what
matters is whether the liability accrued [prepetition].”223 The court then looked
carefully at the eligibility requirements for the disaster payment, engaging in a
factual inquiry.224 Ultimately, the court held that the debtors met all the
program requirements prepetition, and that the debtors’ right to a payment
accrued prepetition.225 The debtors only had to make the decision whether to
exercise the right postpetition.226 The act of applying for a payment does not,
by itself, make the government’s liability for the payment a postpetition
debt.227 Rather, the right to payment is deemed to accrue prepetition if the
debtors satisfy all requirements for obtaining payment under a government
program prepetition.228 Therefore, setoff could be validly exercised by the
USDA under 7 C.F.R. § 1412.406.229
Other courts have not disagreed with the rule articulated in Gibson.230 It
therefore appears to put forth a bright line rule as to when a crop disaster
payment “arose” for the purposes of setoff under § 553 of the Code: it is
immaterial whether a debtor files a postpetition application as long as the
payment was “absolutely owing” as of the petition date.231
Gibson furthermore suggests that this rule is not limited to the crop disaster
payment context, and may extend to government payments generally.232 Gerth

220

Id.
Id. at 768–69 (citing Braniff Airways Inc. v. Exxon Co., 814 F.2d 1030, 1035 (5th Cir.1987)).
222 Id. at 766.
223 Id. at 767.
224 Id. at 768–69.
225 Id. at 768–70.
226 Id. at 769.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 766.
230 See generally In re Farmer, No. 10-09353, 2012 WL 4905480 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2012); In re U.S.
Aeroteam, Inc., 327 B.R. 852 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005).
231 See Gibson, 308 B.R. at 763.
232 Id. at 767–69.
221
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and Matthieson seem to support this test by adopting an approach that requires
“all transactions necessary” to occur prior to the debtor’s filing for
bankruptcy.233 The test for determining whether the government has a right to
setoff with respect to government payments is therefore clearer under § 553
than under § 541 property of the estate analysis.
IV. RECENT CASE LAW (2008–PRESENT)
As discussed earlier, circuit court cases in the 2000s set a bright line rule
that payments authorized by postpetition legislation are not property of the
estate under § 541.234 These decisions, however, did not explicitly state at what
point a debtor obtains a legal or equitable interest in a government payment.235
In terms of the right to setoff under § 553, there appears to be a clearer rule:
that the payment must be “absolutely owing” at the time of the bankruptcy
petition.236
Since 2008, however, few cases related to these issues have been decided.
A contributing reason may be an increase in settlements.237 The few cases on
point, which deal with SURE payments, reveal the lack of a clear standard as
to when government payments become property of the bankruptcy estate.238
Furthermore, debtors may be successfully arguing that a legal interest in a
government payment does not arise until the program application date or the
statutory authorization date.239
This reasoning is inconsistent with the Code because these events are not
determinative of when a debtor has a legal interest in a government
payment.240 Instead a more searching factual inquiry is necessary. Recent cases
deal with only two of the factual buckets: prepetition legislation followed by a

233

See United States v. Gerth, 991 F.2d 1428, 1435 (8th Cir. 1993); Moratzka v. Agric. Stabilization &
Conservation Serv. (In re Matthieson), 63 B.R. 56, 58‒59 (D. Minn. 1986).
234 See supra text accompanying notes 138–48, 150–60, 167–79. See generally In re Gibson, 308 B.R.
763 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
235 See generally Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2006); Burgess v. Sikes
(In re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2006); Drewes v. Vote, (In re Vote), 261 B.R. 439 (B.A.P. 8th Cir.
2001).
236 See generally Gibson, 308 B.R. 763.
237 See, e.g., Consent Order to Lift Stay and Offset, In re Farmer, No. 10-09353, (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar.
30, 2012).
238 See id.; In re Farmer, No. 10-09353, 2012 WL 4905480, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 15, 2012); In re
VanderHouwen, No. 03-01244, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 156, at *9 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Jan. 15, 2010).
239 See, e.g., Farmer, 2012 WL 4905480, at *2; VanderHouwen, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 156.
240 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012).
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postpetition application, and when both the legislation and the filing of the
application occur postpetition.
A. Prepetition Legislation and Postpetition Application Date
The two SURE cases in this factual bucket each deal with § 553 and the
right of setoff. The first case was decided easily, and a setoff was granted.241 In
the second case, the parties reached a settlement on one issue.242 On the second
issue, the court found the statutory authorization date to be determinative of
when a government payment is “absolutely owed,” yet interestingly still
engaged in a factual inquiry.243
In the first case, In re Smith, the debtor owed the USDA $66,142.244 On
November 19, 2011, the debtor filed for bankruptcy, and shortly thereafter
filed an application for a SURE payment due to the destruction of his 2010
crop.245 On April 3, 2012, the USDA filed a Motion for Offset. The
government’s Motion to Lift the Stay asserted that although the application for
the SURE payment was not filed until after the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the
debt arose prior to bankruptcy and the USDA possessed the right to offset.246
On June 4, 2012, the Court granted the USDA’s motion to lift the automatic
stay, which allowed the offset of the SURE payment.247
The second case, In re Farmer, is similar to Smith because the authorizing
legislation was signed prepetition, but the debtor filed a SURE application
postpetition.248 In Farmer the debtor filed for chapter 12 on November 11,
2010.249 On November 30, 2010, the USDA designated forty-two North
Carolina counties as a Primary Natural Disaster Areas, including the county
where the debtor resides.250 In 2011, the debtor filed a SURE application due
to the destruction of his 2010 crop, and received a payment of $53,316.251 On

241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248

Order for Offset, In re Smith, No. 11-08865 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. June 4, 2012).
Motion to Lift Stay and for Offset, In re Farmer, No. 10-09353 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Feb. 29, 2012).
In re Farmer, No. 10-09353, 2012 WL 4905480, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 15, 2012).
Motion for Offset at 1, In re Smith, No. 11-08865 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Apr. 3, 2012).
Id.
Id. at 2.
Order for Offset, In re Smith, No. 11-08865 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. June 4, 2012).
See Motion to Lift Stay and for Offset at 1–2, In re Farmer, No. 10-09353 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Feb. 29,

2012).
249
250
251

See id. at 1.
News Release, supra note 8; see Motion to Lift Stay and for Offset at 2, Farmer, No. 10-09353.
Motion to Lift Stay and for Offset at 2, Farmer, No. 10-09353.
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February 29, 2012, the USDA filed a motion for offset.252 The debtor objected,
stating the USDA “sought to offset a [postpetition] claim of the [d]ebtor
against [the USDA’s prepetition] claim.”253 Rather than go to trial, the parties
agreed to settle.254 Under the settlement, $30,000 was offset by the USDA and
the debtor received $23,316.00.255
After settling the SURE payment, the parties then turned to the status of
certain Direct and Countercyclical Program (DCP) payments.256 On May 31,
2012, the debtor applied to participate in the DCP for the 2012 crop year.257
USDA determined the debtor was entitled to $7,255, and filed a motion to lift
the automatic stay in order to offset.258 The court held a hearing on the issue of
whether the 2012 DCP payments arose prepetition or postpetition.259 The
USDA asserted that the DCP program began in 2002 and was continued in
2008 through passage of the Farm Bill, which provided funding through the
2012 crop year.260
The court held that the debtor “became eligible for DCP funds in 2008 with
the passage of the 2008 Farm Bill.”261 The court reasoned that at that point the
USDA became obligated to pay farmers eligible for DCP through 2012.262
Therefore, the statutory authorization date was determinative of when the
payment became absolutely owed.263 Interestingly, the debtor’s land was a mix
of owned and leased property.264 The court concluded the payments as to the
owned land arose prepetition, but those as to the leased land arose
postpetition.265 When the debtor filed for bankruptcy in 2010, it was not certain
that he would have control over this land in 2012.266 A condition necessary for
payment, the debtor’s control, occurred postpetition.267
252

Id. at 1.
Objection to Motion to Lift Stay and for Offset at 1, In re Farmer, No. 10-09353 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
Mar. 12, 2012).
254 Consent Order to Lift Stay and Offset, In re Farmer, No. 10-09353 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2012).
255 Id. at 2.
256 See In re Farmer, No. 10-09353, 2012 WL 4905480, at *1 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 15, 2012).
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id. at *2.
262 Id.
263 See id. at *1–2.
264 Id. at *2.
265 Id. at *1.
266 Id.
267 Id. at *2.
253
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These cases further the idea that a clearer standard guides analysis under
§ 553 than § 541, which necessitates a factual inquiry. However, even in the
§ 553 context, courts are beginning to regard the statutory authorization date as
determinative to “absolutely owing” analysis, post- Vote, Burgess, and
Bracewell. In Farmer, the parties reached a settlement as to the SURE
payment. Although the precise reason is uncertain, a searching factual inquiry
reveals agency discretion over a condition necessary for payment, a novel issue
unaddressed by bankruptcy courts.
B. Postpetition Legislation and Postpetition Application Date
The two cases in this factual bucket each present the issue of whether a
government assistance payment is property of the estate under § 541, postVote, Burgess, and Bracewell. The first case, In re Andrews, did not deal with a
crop disaster payment program but with an economic stimulus payment.268 In
Andrews, the debtor filed for bankruptcy on June 28, 2007.269 On February 13,
2008, the Economic Stimulus Act was signed into law, and the debtor
immediately became eligible for a payment of $1,200.270 To determine whether
the stimulus payment was property of the estate, the court began its analysis by
noting that the scope of § 541(a)(1) is broad and includes novel or contingent
property interests.271 However, the court cautioned that a broad judicial
construction of § 541(a)(1) must also be constrained by the plain language of
the statute, and only reach legal interests that existed as of the commencement
of the case.272
The court acknowledged that similar to Vote’s crop disaster payments, the
economic stimulus payment was not property of the estate because the federal
legislation authorizing the payment was not enacted prior to the bankruptcy
filing.273 The court reasoned that if a debtor has no means of knowing he
qualifies for a government payment, no legal right can conceptually or actually
exist.274 The court explained that “the inquiry is best determined by treating the

268

In re Andrews, 386 B.R. 871, 872 (Bankr. D. Utah 2008); Schneider, supra note 187.
Andrews, 386 B.R. at 872.
270 Id. at 872–73.
271 Id. at 873 (citing In re Montgomery, 224 F.3d 1193, 1194 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Barowsky v.
Serelson, 946 F.2d 1516, 1518‒19 (10th Cir. 1991))).
272 Id. (quoting Drewes v. Vote (In re Vote), 261 B.R. 439, 442 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001)).
273 Id. at 874.
274 Id.
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date of petition as the deciding factor and applying the analysis of In re
Vote.”275
Another case worth noting is In re VanderHouwen, in which the legislation
and the application were both passed postpetition.276 The court found that
“[c]ircuit cases on the issue agree that the date of enactment of the crop
disaster program is determinative as to whether the [government payment] is
property of the bankruptcy estate.”277 Following this rule, the court held that
the postpetition payment was not property of the estate.278 This reasoning
strongly suggests that the date of legislation is determinative and therefore
provides a bright line rule when engaging in § 541 analysis.279
These cases suggest that courts are beginning to regard the statutory
authorization date as determinative in § 541 analysis. This result is inconsistent
with the language of § 541, and indicates the need for a clear rule to determine
when a government payment becomes property of the estate.280
V. ENFORCEABLE STANDARDS UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In administrative law, the question of when a government payment
becomes a “property interest” is relevant in the context of Fifth Amendment
due process issues.281 The due process right provided in the Fifth Amendment
protects individuals only from deprivations of life, liberty, and property.282
Once an individual has a recognized property interest under the Fifth
Amendment, that individual cannot be deprived of this interest without due
process of law prior to the deprivation.283 In the 1970s, the Supreme Court
formulated a clear rule as to when a government payment becomes a property
interest for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.284 This rule could be applied in
275

Id.
See In re VanderHouwen, No. 03-01244, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 156, at *8–9 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Jan.
15, 2010).
277 Id.
278 Id. at *9.
279 Id.
280 See In re Farmer, No. 10-09353, 2012 WL 4905480 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 15, 2012); VanderHouwen,
2010 Bankr. LEXIS 156.
281 See generally Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1972).
282 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
283 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 570–71 (stating that the court must determine whether the benefit at stake is a
property or liberty interest before due process of law is required); Perry, 408 U.S. at 599 (stating that there is
no due process requirement unless a property or liberty interest is implicated).
284 See generally Roth, 408 U.S. 564; Perry, 408 U.S. 593.
276
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the bankruptcy context to provide clear guidance on when a debtor obtains a
legal or equitable interest in a government payment when agency discretion is
an issue.
The first case the Supreme Court decided was Board of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth. The plaintiff in Roth was an untenured professor at a public
university who was informed, without explanation, that his contract would not
be renewed the following year.285 The professor sued, claiming that the failure
to provide him with notice and a hearing constituted a violation of his due
process rights.286 The Supreme Court found that Roth’s due process rights
were not violated because he did not have a property interest in his contract for
employment.287 The Court reasoned that “[t]o have a property interest in a
benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for
it . . . [and] more than a unilateral expectation of it.”288 Rather, a person needs
“a legitimate claim of entitlement to [that benefit].”289 In this case, the express
terms of the plaintiff’s annual contract created no possible claim of entitlement
to re-employment.290
Perry v. Sindermann, which was decided on the same day as Roth, also
involved a claim by an untenured public university professor who lost his job
following a short-term contract.291 In contrast to Roth, the court in Perry found
that the professor did have a property interest in his employment.292 Unlike the
employer in Roth, the employer in Perry had produced guidelines, handbooks
and other official publications that may have created a “de-facto” tenure
system.293 One faculty guideline provided that “[t]he Administration of the
College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent tenure as long
as his teaching services are satisfactory.”294 Because of the plaintiff’s reliance
on this language, he may have had a due process right that demanded his
continued employment.295 Therefore, refusing to renew the professor’s contract

285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295

Roth, 408 U.S. at 566, 569.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 577.
Id.
Id. at 575.
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 594 (1972).
Id. at 602–03.
Id. at 599–602.
Id. at 600.
See id. at 600–01.
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with no explanation may have constituted a violation of his due process
rights.296
The reason the Supreme Court found that a property right may exist in
Perry, but not in Roth, was the existence of guidelines or standards.297 Without
such guidelines, the government entity was not bound to act in a certain
way.298 However, if guidelines were articulated, a “de facto” system may be
found, creating an expectation and property right.299
VI. ANALYSIS
Recent holdings run contrary to both the Code and relevant case law
because these cases state or imply that the statutory authorization date is
determinative of when a debtor obtains a legal interest in a government
payment.300 This is not the correct approach because the statutory authorization
date is not necessarily the same as the date a debtor acquires a legal interest in
a government payment as required by § 541(a)(1). Although the Vote, Burgess,
and Bracewell decisions state that government payments authorized by
postpetition legislation are not property of the estate, they do not go so far as to
say that this is determinative in § 541 analysis. In the context of setoff, § 553
requires each debt to have arisen prepetition. Case law has formulated a clearer
rule to determine when a government payment arose, articulated as when the
payment is “absolutely owed.” Despite this clear rule recent cases also indicate
confusion as to the effect of Vote, Burgess, and Bracewell in the § 553 context,
and the importance attached the statutory authorization date.
This Comment proposes that the standard under both provisions should be
when a government payment is “absolutely owed.”301 A payment becomes
“absolutely owing” when all of the conditions required for payment are
satisfied, emphasizing the factual inquiry required under both §§ 541 and
553.302 When a condition necessary for payment is dependent upon an act

296

Id. at 599.
Compare Board of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), with Perry, 408 U.S. 593.
298 See generally Roth, 408 U.S. 564; Perry, 408 U.S. 593.
299 See generally Roth, 408 U.S. 564; Perry, 408 U.S. 593.
300 Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a), 553 (2012), with In re Farmer, No. 10-09353, 2012 WL 4905480
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct, 15, 2012); In re VanderHouwen, No. 03-01244, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 156 (Bankr. E.D.
Wash. Jan. 15, 2010).
301 See Traders Bank of Kan. City v. Stonitsch (In re Isis Foods, Inc.), 24 B.R. 75, 76 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1982).
302 See In re Gibson, 308 B.R. 763, 767‒68 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
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within an agency’s discretion, analysis should be guided by administrative law.
Analysis in this situation would turn on whether the agency has created
guidelines or standards that create the kind of legitimate expectations discussed
in Regency and Roth.303 When such guidelines exist, agency discretion is
limited accordingly.304 Adopting this clear standard will limit arguments that a
debtor obtains a legal right to a government payment at an alternative point in
time, and clear up the law post- Vote, Burgess, and Bracewell.
Reproduced below is a table of the discussed case law, and which factual
“bucket” each case falls into:

Prepetition
Application
Date
Postpetition

Legislation Date
Prepetition
Gerth
Mattice
Schneider
Matthieson
Segal
Ring
Lesmeister
Boyett
Gibson
Smith
Farmer

Postpetition

Lemos
Vote
Burgess
Bracewell
Andrews
VanderHouwen

The cases in italics are the recent cases. The cases in bold are those that
discuss the right to setoff under § 553. The cases in plain text are those that
deal with § 541 property of the estate analysis. The table is useful because it
highlights the factual differences that have in part led to inconsistent holdings
as to when a debtor obtains a legal interest in a government payment.
A. Prepetition Legislation and Prepetition Application Date
In the context of prepetition legislation and a prepetition application date,
debtors often argue that they do not have a legal interest in a government
payment until the application approval date, or some other point in time

303
304

See supra text accompanying notes 282296.
See Perry, 408 U.S. at 598–99.
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postpetition.305 In cases dealing with property of the estate analysis under
§ 541, such as Mattice and Schneider, courts have held that a debtor does not
hold an interest in a government payment until the application is approved.306
However, the government payments at issue in Mattice and Schneider were
contractual in nature.307 Until each party approves the contract, a legal right or
interest in a government payment could not exist; and in the case of a
declaration, a regulation mandated approval of the contract by each party.308
In contrast, Gerth and Matthieson, which fall in the same factual bucket,
deal with the right to setoff under § 553.309 In Matthieson, factually similar to
Mattice and Schneider, the debtor argued he did not have a legal interest in the
government payment until the application was approved.310 In Matthieson,
however, this argument failed because the government payment program at
issue was an assistance program, and mutual duties were not required to be
exchanged.311 Therefore, agreement or application approval was not a
condition precedent to eligibility for payment.312 In Matthieson, the debtor met
all of the conditions for payment prior to the application date, making the
payment “absolutely owing.”313 In Gerth, however, the program was
contractual in nature.314 The court rejected the debtor’s argument that he did
not obtain a legal right to the payment until funds were distributed, and held
that the debtor’s performance was not a “transaction necessary” to the farmer
being entitled to payment, since the parties had already exchanged mutual
promises, including the government’s promise to pay.315
Case law shows that the distinction between contractual programs and
assistance programs is an important threshold consideration. In the government
payment context, an initial determination should be made as to whether the
program is contractual in nature or purely a form of subsidy or assistance. An
assistance program does not require as a condition precedent a mutual
agreement because the payment is “absolutely owing” once the eligible debtor
305 See, e.g., Moratzka v. Agric. Stabilization & Conservation Serv. (In re Matthieson) 63 B.R. 56, 58 (D.
Minn. 1986); In re Mattice, 81 B.R. 504, 506 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987).
306 See Schneider v. Nazar (In re Schneider), 864 F.2d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1988); Mattice, 81 B.R. at 506.
307 See Schneider, 864 F.2d at 685; Mattice, 81 B.R. at 506.
308 See Schneider, 864 F.2d at 685‒86.
309 See United States v. Gerth, 991 F.2d 1428, 1429 (8th Cir. 1993); Matthieson, 63 B.R. at 58.
310 See Matthieson, 63 B.R. at 58.
311 Id. at 58–60.
312 Id. at 60.
313 See id.
314 See Gerth, 991 F.2d 1433.
315 See id. 1434‒35.
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satisfies all of the program requirements. The proposed rule is applicable in
both of these contexts because, in a contractual program, an event necessary
for a payment to become “absolutely owed” is mutual ratification. In an
assistance program, the debtor needs to meet certain requirements, but no
agency approval or actions serve as a condition precedent for eligibility.
B. Prepetition Legislation and Postpetition Application Date
The second factual bucket deals with cases where the legislation is passed
prepetition but the debtor does not file an application until after the petition
date. The rule that emerges from cases discussing property of the estate under
§ 541 in this factual category, is that a debtor obtains a legal interest in a
government payment when all events giving rise to the benefit occur
prepetition.316 Although the reasoning behind the rule can be different, from
Ring’s reliance on the definition of proceeds in the UCC, to Boyett’s focus on
the language of § 541(a)(1) and (6), the overall purpose appears to be the
same.317 For example, in Lesmeister, the court found that the debtor had a legal
interest in the government payment at issue at the time of the bankruptcy
petition because all transactions necessary to payment had already occurred.318
The debtor’s argument that he had no such interest failed because the
regulation’s promulgation was not a transaction necessary for the debtor to
become entitled to payment.319
Similar to the previous factual bucket, these cases do not set a specific
moment in time when the debtor obtains a legal or equitable interest in a
government payment. However, the court in Boyett explicitly rejects the
program application date as a qualifying event determinative to § 541(a)
analysis in the context of assistance programs.320 The applicability of Segal
and its “so rooted” test is barely addressed,321 but it appears that the cases in
this factual bucket would almost always satisfy such an approach. If the
legislation was passed prepetition and the crop was lost prepetition, the events
316 See Boyett v. Moore (In re Boyett), 250 B.R. 817, 822 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2000); Drewes v. Lesmeister
(In re Lesmeister), 242 B.R. 920, 926 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1999).
317 See Boyett, 250 B.R. at 822; cf. Kelley v. Ring (In re Ring), 169 B.R. 73, 77 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993)
(holding that crop disaster payments were proceeds from prepetition crops). “Proceeds” is not defined by the
Code, leading some courts to use the UCC definition to help guide analysis. See id. The UCC, however, is not
dispositive in interpreting the statutory language of the Code. Id.
318 Lesmeister, 242 B.R. at 926.
319 Id. at 925–26.
320 Boyett, 250 B.R. at 822.
321 See generally id. at 821; Lesmeister, 242 B.R. 920.
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seem “so rooted” in the prebankruptcy past so as to constitute property of the
bankruptcy estate.322
The only case discussing § 553 in this factual bucket is Gibson, which
holds that a debt arises prepetition when the debt is “absolutely owing” on the
petition date.323 Although the application was filed postpetition, applying for a
payment does not, without more, make the government’s liability for the
payment a postpetition debt.324 Rather, a debt is “absolutely owed” when the
debtors satisfy all requirements for obtaining payment under the government
program.325 Gibson appears to indicate that the § 553 analysis has a clearer rule
than § 541(a) analysis.326
Using the “absolutely owed” Gibson rule in the § 541(a) context may help
place emphasis on the necessary factual inquiry. Under both §§ 541 and 553, a
debtor obtains a legal interest in a government payment when all requirements
necessary for payment are satisfied. For example, under SURE, a debtor is
entitled to payment when he possesses insurance, experiences a qualifying
loss, and the county he resides in is designated a primary disaster area.327 All
requirements will be satisfied and the payment will be absolutely owed when
these conditions are satisfied. This fact-intensive approach should produce
more consistent results, in line with the language and temporal limitations of
the Code.328
C. Postpetition Legislation and Postpetition Application Date
Case law in the postpetition legislation and postpetition application fact
pattern varies greatly, largely hinging upon whether a court believes Segal’s
“so rooted” test survived passage of the Code.329 Early cases such as Lemos
found the purpose-based approach of Segal to apply and control analysis.330 In
Lemos, the court held that the government payments at issue resulted from
322

See Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966).
See In re Gibson, 308 B.R. 763, 767‒68 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
324 Id. at 769.
325 Id. at 769–70.
326 Compare id. at 766–69, with Lesmeister, 242 B.R. at 923–26.
327 See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 8.
328 See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a), 553 (2012).
329 Compare Lemos v. Rakozy (In re Lemos), 243 B.R. 96, 100 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999) (using the “so
rooted” test), abrogated by In re Stallings, 290 B.R. 777, 781–82 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003), with Drewes v. Vote
(In re Vote), 276 F.3d 1024, 1026–27 (8th Cir. 2002) (declining to use Segal’s “so rooted” where debtor had a
“mere hope” to obtain relief).
330 See Lemos, 243 B.R. at 99–100.
323
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activities and events “so rooted” in the prebankruptcy past that they constituted
a legal interest under § 541(a)(1).331 Although the authorizing legislation had
not been passed at the time of the bankruptcy petition, the debtor had a
contingent interest in the prospect of a federal program being adopted by
Congress.332 This is in stark contrast to the decisions in Vote, Burgess, and
Bracewell.333 Taking a literal approach to § 541(a)(1)’s temporal limitation,
those courts held that a debtor could not have a legal interest in a government
payment that was not yet authorized by statute at the time of the bankruptcy
petition.334 Such a prospect was a mere expectancy, and did not constitute a
contingent interest.335
Bracewell and Burgess featured divided courts, with vocal dissents. The
majority in each case rejected Segal’s “so rooted” test, strongly supporting
Vote’s position that § 541(a)(1)’s temporal limitation controlled the analysis.336
The dissents, however, viewed § 541(a)(1) differently, noting its broad
language was intended to bring within property of the estate contingent and
unmatured claims.337 Furthermore, they found the Code and its legislative
history to support survival of Segal’s purpose-based approach.338 The dissent
reasoned that if the crop was lost prepetition, then a crop disaster payment
authorized by postpetition legislation could still be property of the estate, since
the events giving rise to the payment were “so rooted” in the prebankruptcy
past.339
The pre-Code practices doctrine is a statutory interpretation principle
stating, “pre-Code practices continue to be valid, unless Congress evinced
clear intent to depart from them under the Code.”340 Due to this practice, unless
Segal and its “so-rooted” test is expressly rejected, the case has survived
passage of the Code and is still valid law. The legislative history of the Code
states that “[t]he result in Segal v. Rochelle is followed, and the right to a

331

Id.
Id. at 99.
333 Compare id. at 100 (using the “so rooted” test), with Vote, 276 F.3d at 1026–27.
334 Vote, 276 F.3d at 1026.
335 See id. at 1026–27.
336 Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454 F.3d 1234, 1241‒42 (11th Cir. 2006); Burgess v. Sikes (In
re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 2006).
337 See Bracewell, 454 F.3d at 1249‒50; Burgess, 438 F.3d at 516‒17.
338 See Bracewell, 454 F.3d at 1249; Burgess, 438 F.3d at 512.
339 See Bracewell, 454 F.3d at 1249; Burgess, 438 F.3d at 512.
340 Cf. Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in a
Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, at 57 (2006).
332

BOXOLD GALLEYSPROOFS2

466

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

8/7/2014 12:12 PM

[Vol. 30

refund is property of the estate.”341 The dissent and majority opinions in
Burgess and Bracewell viewed the use of the word “refund” differently. The
definition of refund in Black’s Law Dictionary is “[t]he return of money to a
person who overpaid, such as a taxpayer who overestimated tax liability or
whose employer withheld too much tax from earnings.”342 This definition
supports the proposition that Congress didn’t intend for Segal to apply to
government payment programs generally, but rather wanted to limit its reach to
cases involving refunds for overpayment.
The legislative history, however, maintains that “[t]he result of Segal v.
Rochelle is . . . followed.”343 The phrase which follows, “and the right to a
refund is property of the estate,” seems explanatory, rather than limiting, in
nature.344 Segal created a very broad “so rooted” test, which, if expressly
followed would reach beyond the narrow tax refund context.345 The Supreme
Court, however, denied a petition for certiorari in Bracewell, lending some
credence to its central holding that a government payment authorized by
postpetition legislation is not property of the estate.346 This may be because the
majority reached the correct result in the case even though they were wrong in
finding Segal did not survive passage of the Code. Under the Segal test and
§ 541(a)(1)’s temporal limitation, a debtor cannot have a legal interest in a
government payment not yet authorized by Congress on the date of the
bankruptcy petition.347 Payment related to a non-existent program seems far
from “rooted” in the prebankruptcy past.348
D. Recent Case Law and the Proposed Rule
The recent case law discussed indicates the need for a clear standard postVote, Burgess, and Bracewell. In Farmer, as to the SURE payment, the
involved parties reached a settlement.349 The Gibson rule, however, should
have resulted in an easy victory for the government. As to the DCP payment in

341

H.R. REP. 95-595, at 367 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1394 (9th ed. 2009).
343 H.R. REP. 95-595, at 367.
344 Id.
345 See generally Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
346 See Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454 F.3d 1234, 1247 (11th Cir. 2006), cert denied, 549 U.S.
1301 (2007).
347 See Segal, 382 U.S. at 380–81.
348 Contra id. at 375.
349 Consent Order to Lift Stay and Offset at 1, In re Farmer, No. 10-09353 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 30,
2012).
342
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Farmer, the court found the statutory authorization date to be indicative of
when USDA’s obligation to the debtor arose.350 This was a strange result,
especially when one considers the fact that the DCP payment was tied to the
debtor’s postpetition 2012 crop.351 Finally, in VanderHouwen, the court held
that “the date of enactment of the crop disaster program is determinative as to
whether the [crop disaster payment] is property of the bankruptcy estate.”352
These holdings, which regard the statutory authorization date as determinative
in §§ 541 and 553 analysis, run afoul of the Code and relevant case law.
The proposed rule, that a debtor obtains a legal right in a government
payment when the payment is “absolutely owed,” stresses the necessary factual
inquiry under §§ 541 and 553, and limits alternative approaches. One such
approach, which courts seem to be endorsing, is that a right to a government
payment is created when the legislation authorizing the payment is passed.353
This argument, however, seems to contradict the Code because it would give
debtors in certain cases a legal interest in government payments authorized by
prepetition legislation, but tied to postpetition losses. This stretches the
language of both §§ 541(a)(1) and 553.354 Under § 541(a)(1) how could the
debtor possibly have a “legal or equitable interest” in a government payment as
of the petition date when he has yet to experience a qualifying loss?
Such a reading would blatantly distort the provision’s temporal limitation,
and expand the bankruptcy estate’s reach to all government payments
authorized by prepetition legislation regardless of when the events necessary
for payment occurred. Cases that apply this rule, such as VanderHouwen,
misinterpret Vote, Burgess, and Bracewell.355 These cases did not find the
statutory authorization date to be determinative, and only held that payments
authorized by postpetition legislation were not property of the estate.356
A second alternative approach: that a debtor obtains a legal interest in a
government payment only upon agency approval of the application, is based on
cases like Mattice and Schneider. In Mattice and Schneider, the type of
350
351
352

In re Farmer, No. 10-09353, 2012 WL 4905480, at *1–2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct, 15, 2012).
See id. at *1.
In re VanderHouwen, No. 03-01244, 2010 WL 227679, at *8–9 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 15, 2010) (emphasis

added).
353

See id.
See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), 553 (2012).
355 See Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454 F.3d 1234, 1247 (11th Cir. 2006); Burgess v. Sikes (In
re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 507‒08 (5th Cir. 2006).
356 Compare Bracewell, 454 F.3d at 1247, and Burgess, 438 F.3d at 507‒08, with VanderHouwen, 2010
WL 227679, at *8–9.
354
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government payment program involved required continuing duties to be
performed by both the debtor and the government.357 The courts in each case
held that the debtor did not have an interest in the government payment until
the application was approved by the administering agency.358 But in the
context of creating a contract, approval and execution of an agreement is a
condition necessary for eligibility. These cases are consistent with a rule that
focuses upon when the payment becomes “absolutely owing” and all
conditions required for payment are satisfied. It is important, however, to keep
in mind that if the government program at issue is contractual, then approval is
a necessary condition, and the debtor cannot obtain a legal interest in the
payment until such approval is obtained.
The rule that a debtor obtains a legal interest in a government payment
when the debt is “absolutely owing” and all requirements for payment are
satisfied is preferable and is a more accurate interpretation of the Code than the
alternative approaches. The factual inquiry required by this rule is compatible
with § 541(a)(1)’s temporal limitation.359 It is also consistent with Segal and
does away with the need to find Segal superseded by the passage of the Code,
as the majority opinions in Burgess and Bracewell did.360
Another aspect of the “absolutely owing” rule that must be addressed is the
effect of agency discretion on a condition necessary for payment. To help
guide analysis of this issue, bankruptcy law should look for guidance in
administrative law. Although administrative law is not dispositive when
interpreting the statutory provisions of the Code, administrative law is a useful
and effective guide.
In administrative law, for purposes of due process, an individual has a
property right or interest when the agency creates guidelines or standards.361
The two seminal cases of Perry and Roth illustrate this rule.362 In Roth, the
public university did and said nothing to give employees an expectation of

357 See Schneider v. Nazar (In re Schneider), 864 F.2d 683, 685–86 (10th Cir. 1988); In re Mattice, 81
B.R. 504, 505–07 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987) (duty to not plant crops in exchange for payment).
358 See Schneider, 864 F.2d at 685–86; Mattice, 81 B.R. at 505–07.
359 Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
360 See generally Bracewell, 454 F.3d at 1241–42; Burgess, 438 F.3d at 498.
361 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 566–67 (1972); cf. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
602–03 (1972).
362 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 566–67 (1972); cf. Perry, 408 U.S. at 602–03 (1972) (allowing plaintiff to
attempt to prove that administrator’s discretion was cabined sufficiently to make his interest in continued
employment a property interest).

BOXOLD GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

8/7/2014 12:12 PM

GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS

469

continued employment.363 Contrastingly, the public university in Perry issued
a handbook that led the professor to believe his employment would continue as
long as his performance was satisfactory.364 The employee fired in Perry may
have held a property interest because of these enforceable standards, while the
employee in Roth did not.365 This “enforceable standards” rule can be applied
in bankruptcy cases when a condition is subject to agency discretion. If there
are standards guiding that discretion at the time of the bankruptcy petition, then
the condition can be regarded as satisfied. If no such standards exist then the
condition is subject to the agency’s pure unbridled discretion, rendering the
condition unsatisfied and leaving the debtor with no legal interest at the time of
the petition. Such a rule could provide useful guidance to bankruptcy courts
considering whether government payments subject to agency discretion are
property of the estate under § 541(a)(1), or subject to setoff under § 553.
E. Application to SURE
Applying the proposed framework to SURE demonstrates its efficacy, and
resolves a number of the issues posed by the SURE program. The first step is
to determine when a payment under SURE becomes “absolutely owing,” and
all requirements necessary for payment are satisfied. In the context of SURE
payments, all requirements are met in most cases when: (1) the farmer suffers
the necessary crop loss; (2) the farmer possesses USDA crop insurance; and
(3) the crop is located in a Secretarial Designated Disaster County.366 If all
three requirements are met prepetition, then the payment is “absolutely owed”
and is property of the bankruptcy estate under § 541, or can be subject to setoff
under § 553. The third condition often takes months, and may occur
postpetition, presenting a temporal issue.367 If the Secretary Disaster
Designation does occur postpetition, analysis then turns to the administrative
law framework, focusing on whether the USDA created enforceable standards
to guide agency discretion.

363

See Roth, 408 U.S. at 566–67.
Perry, 408 U.S. at 600.
365 Compare Roth, 408 U.S. at 568 (explaining that there was no expectation for employee to assume that
he had property right in his employment continuing), with Perry, 408 U.S. at 600–01 (showing that by
providing employee guidelines and a handbook, employer created enforceable standards by which to follow if
it wanted to release employee).
366 See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 8.
367 See Motion to Lift Stay and for Offset at 2, In re Farmer, No. 10-09353 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Feb. 29,
2012); News Release, supra note 10.
364
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The SURE program’s statutory and regulatory language provides the
Secretary of Agriculture with little guidance as to when to designate a county
as a Secretarial Designated Disaster County.368 The regulations are so
subjective that they do not seem to create an expectation that a designation will
be granted.369 Although the new regulations provide for automatic designation
when certain drought levels are reached, discretion remains in a large number
of other cases.370 This discretion with no enforceable guidelines or standards
means that when a disaster designation is made postpetition, a SURE payment
would not be property of the estate under § 541, or subject to setoff under
§ 553.371 This matters a great deal to creditors, who would not be entitled to
distribution of these funds. The overall effect may seem harsh to creditors, but
the proposed framework is effective, clear, and is the most accurate
interpretation of the Code.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that a government payment becomes property of
the estate when a government payment is (1) “absolutely owed” and (2)
enforceable standards limit agency discretion. Recent case law has regarded
the date the authorizing legislation was signed into law as determinative of
when a debtor obtains a legal interest in a government payment. This approach
misinterprets case law and the language of §§ 541 and 553. The proper
standard should focus on when a government payment is “absolutely owed,”
and all requirements for payment are met. This standard emphasizes the
necessary factual inquiry required by both provisions and can be applied to
assistance- and contract-based government programs alike.
Furthermore, if a condition required for payment is subject to agency
discretion on the date of the petition, administrative law should help guide the
analysis. Perry and Roth indicate that for the purposes of due process, an
individual obtains a property interest in a government payment when an
agency creates enforceable guidelines or standards. If this framework is
adopted going forward, it can help guide analysis and reduce litigation related
to government payments under §§ 541 and 553. The proposed result may not
be comprehensive, but it is a step in the right direction and should provide
368

See 7 C.F.R. § 1945.20 (2013).
See 7 C.F.R. § 1945.20 (“[T]he Secretary . . . [shall] consider whether a [disaster] determination
should be made . . . .”).
370 See 7 C.F.R. § 759.
371 See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), 553 (2012).
369
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some clarity as to exactly when a debtor obtains a legal interest in a
government payment.
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